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Does Growth Lead to Debt Sustainability? Yes, But Not Vice-Versa!  47



                 (iii)  Through expectation multiplier by building confidence in tough times: Governments adopting
                     counter-cyclical fiscal policy are able to credibly exhibit their commitment to sound fiscal
                     management. As a result, rational agents in the economy would expect the economy not to
                     fluctuate as much and therefore their private actions would reinforce this, in turn enabling
                     stronger macroeconomic fundamentals (Konstantinou and Tagkalakis (2011), Alsina et al.
                     (2014)).

                    Numerous studies in economic literature establish this relationship both theoretically and
                empirically.  Ozkan  and  McManus  (2015)  study  the  impact  of  cyclicality  of  fiscal  policy  on
                macroeconomic outcomes for 114 countries over 1950–2010 and establish that following a pro-
                cyclical fiscal stance leads to lower economic growth, higher volatility in output and higher levels
                of inflation. In contrast a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance with policy actions against the cycle
                acts as a stabiliser by reducing output volatility and keeping growth on a steady path. Similarly
                a study by Kharroubi  and Aghion (2008) shows that industries have grown faster in economies
                where fiscal policy has been more countercyclical, both in terms of output and productivity.

                    For  India,  in  the  current  scenario,  when  private  consumption,  which  contributes  to
                54 per cent of GDP is contracting, and investment, which contributes to around 29 per cent is
                uncertain, the relevance of counter-cyclical fiscal policies is paramount. In fact as Krugman
                prescribed, a sustained, productive program of permanent stimulus directed towards public
                investment, in both physical and human capital, is the need of the hour (Krugman 2020).




                        Box 2: Higher Fiscal Multipliers During Economic Slowdown


                    Most studies aimed at estimating the variation in effects of fiscal policies with country’s
                position in the business cycle, concur that the fiscal policies are considerably more effective in
                recessions than in expansions (Barro and Redlick (2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
                Fazzari et al. (2015), Ramey and Zubairy (2015)). Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012(i), (ii)) in
                their seminal paper show large differences in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and
                expansions for the OECD countries and the US, with higher fiscal multipliers during recessionary
                regimes.  These  results  are  maintained  after  allowing  for  different  multipliers  for  different
                components of government spending. They derive the point estimates of the maximum output
                multiplier (over the first 20 quarters) is estimated to be 0.57 during expansions and 2.48 during
                recessions in the US.

                    Riera-Crichton, Vegh and Vuletin (2014) condition the fiscal policy on both the state of
                the business cycle, and the sign/size of the fiscal intervention, and find that fiscal expansions
                in recessions are much more expansionary than fiscal expansions in booms. Jorda and Taylor
                (2016) use the propensity-score based methods for time series data to show that a one per cent
                of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into a loss of 4 per cent of real GDP over five years
                when implemented in a slump, and just 1 per cent in a boom.

                    Different studies attribute this phenomenon of counter-cyclicality of the fiscal multipliers to
                different channels. Some of these are:
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