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External Sector  109


             end-March 2021, reflecting lower repayments and higher current receipts. The share of short-
             term debt in total external debt fell marginally to 17.0 per cent at end-September 2021 from
             17.7 per cent at end-March 2021. Further, a sizeable accretion in reserves, however, led to an
             improvement in other external vulnerability indicators such as forex reserves to total external
             debt, short term debt to foreign exchange reserves, etc. The foreign exchange reserves as a ratio
             to external debt crossed 100 percent after 11 years since 2010, and stood at 107.1 per cent as
             at end-September 2021. The ratio of short-term debt (original maturity) to foreign exchange
             reserves declined to 15.8 per cent at end-September 2021 from 17.5 per cent at end-March 2021.

             3.57  As documented in the previous edition of the Economic Survey, from a medium-term
             perspective, India’s external debt continues to be below what is estimated to be optimal for an
             emerging market economy, while various external sector vulnerability indicators improved over
             the recent years, pointing towards the resilience of India’s external sector.

             3.58  In recent months, scaling back of pandemic-related stimulus programme amidst persistent
             inflationary pressures in advanced economies, particularly the US, have reignited some fears
             of taper tantrum. However, India’s external sector – well supported by strong exports, capital
             inflows, low CAD and external financing requirements and high foreign exchange reserves, with
             various external vulnerability indicators well within manageable limits – is far better prepared
             this time to face any external shocks arising out of tightening of the monetary policy stance by
             the advanced economies in coming months (Box 2).

                       Box 2: Taper without Tantrums: India’s external sector resilience


               The Federal Reserve embarked on a programme of asset purchases under the Quantitative Easing
               (QE), as part of a broader policy response to the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-08. As the US
               economy gained traction, in an attempt to unwind the QE, on May 22, 2013, the Fed announced
               the intent to start tapering asset purchases at a future date, which triggered a tantrum in the form of
               spike in bond yields and resulted in disruptions on the external front for India as well.

               In response to the pandemic, since June 2020, the Fed had been buying US$ 80 billion of Treasury
               securities and US$ 40 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) each month. In late July
               2021, the Fed signalled that it would start reducing the volume of its bond purchases later in the year.
               On November 3, 2021, the Federal Open Market Committee unanimously voted to scale back its asset
               purchases. In line with this, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has also abandoned its yield curve
               target. As yields on government debt climbed, the RBA chose not to intervene to defend its target of 10
               basis points for debt maturing in April 2024. Bank of Canada has gradually tapered its asset purchases
               in recent months. Thus, the long-awaited taper process has commenced by the systemically important
               central banks, renewing thereby an element of interest - within the academia and policy circles - in the
               potentially destabilising spill-over impact on the emerging market and developing economies as also
               for India. There is evidence that, inter alia, these emerging markets, including India, have succeeded
               in strengthening their external economic and financial position since 2013 and the ramifications of the
               taper on the Indian external sector would be limited (Barry Eichengreen et al (2021)).
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