Page 234 - ES 2020-21_Volume-1-2 [28-01-21]
P. 234

Regulatory Forbearance: An Emergency Medicine, Not Staple Diet!  217


                              Figure 16: Weakening of Corporate Governance - Decrease in
                                          Non-Promoter Directors on Board




























                  Source: MCA (for restructured loans) and CMIE Prowess for the composition of boards
                  Pre-forbearance: Average percentage change two years after and before for firms restructured
                  during 2002-06
                  Post-forbearance: Average percentage change two years after and before for firms restructured
                  during 2009-15
             restructured firms in the forbearance window. Total stalled projects (as a proportion of all capex
             projects) increased by 40% (30%) during forbearance, while the same witnessed a decline of 12%
             (18%) pre-forbearance. In other words, in the pre-forbearance period, firms likely re-initiated stalled
             projects  when  injected  credit  through  restructuring,  whereas  firms  in  the  forbearance  window
             witnessed additional stalling, indicating a possible misuse of increased credit supply.

                           Box 6: Increase in the Power of Management for Firms
                                           Benefitting from Forbearance
                Using the difference-in-difference technique discussed in Box 3, this box demonstrates a
                causal  link  between  forbearance  and  increasing  power  of  incumbent  management  using
                panel regressions that control for all confounding factors. Here, firms are classified into two
                groups that are similar on dimensions such as size, age, profitability, leverage, and solvency
                but differ on their ability to obtain restructuring. This difference arises from their possible
                relationships with the banks. Any difference in firm outcomes for the two groups could thus
                be attributed to the difference in their likelihood of restructuring. Four outcomes are studied:
                (i) proportion of independent directors on board, (ii) CEO duality or the likelihood of firm’s
                CEO to also be the chairman of its board, (iii) connectedness in board measured through the
                similarity in the biographies (age, education, other directorships, etc.) and (iv) proportion of
                board directors nominated by banks. For certain variables, data availability is restricted to the
                post-forbearance era. In that case, the outcomes are compared only during forbearance in a
                single difference between treated and control firms. After organizing data at a firm-year level,
                the following regression equation is estimated:
                       Y = α + β × Treatment  × Post + β × Treatment  + β × X + δ + ν + ϵ     it
                                                                       i
                                                                           3
                                                                                it
                                                                                         t
                                                                                     i
                                1
                        it
                                              i
                                                          2
                                                     t
   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239