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Saving Lives and Livelihoods Amidst a Once-in-a-Century Crisis 15

INDIA’S HUMANE POLICY RESPONSE: SHORT-TERM PAIN, LONG-
TERM GAIN
1.22 In the absence of a potent cure, preventive vaccine; interplay of network structures in
densely populated areas, and a high CFR, India weighed the costs and opportunities strategically.
The limits of scientific understanding of the disease, lack of good data on the mode of spread
and potency of the virus made it difficult to model the likely impact of different policy options
in a reliable and timely way. To aggravate the uncertainty, it was estimated that India would have
30 crore cases and several thousand deaths by the end of May, 2020 (Klein et al., 2020).

1.23 Given that India is the second largest populated country in the world with a high density,
the transmission potential of COVID-19 was high. The pace of spread of the virus through
contact, probable transmission from asymptomatic cases, the disproportionately higher mortality
seen among individuals of the age more than 60 years and the escalation of the pressure on the
health infrastructure of many developed countries were alarming and increased the potential
threat to ‘lives’. In the absence of both a vaccine and a treatment, failing to impose restrictions
on the free movement of individuals during the pandemic would have exposed the population
to a contagious threat, thereby leading to deaths in enormous numbers. However, the economic
impact of the lockdowns and closure of economic activity would have adversely impacted the
‘livelihoods’ of people. COVID-19, therefore, posited complex and multi-faceted health and
socio-economic trade-offs for policymakers – whether to save ‘lives’ or ‘livelihoods’.

1.24 Evidence showed that the timing of intervention was crucial as population density plays
a crucial role in aggravating spread at the onset of a pandemic and that speed and duration of
lockdowns help in keeping mortality in control. Learning from the Spanish Flu experience also
showed that timing matters - early and extensive lockdowns led to greater delays in reaching peak
mortality, lower peak mortality rates and overall lower mortality burden. Swift lockdowns also had
no adverse effect on local economic outcomes. On the contrary, cities that intervened earlier and
more aggressively experience a relative increase in real economic activity after the pandemic.
1.25 Given the ‘black swan event’ marked by sheer uncertainty and once in a century crisis,
Indian policymakers followed an approach similar to the Barbell strategy in finance – hedging
for the worst outcome initially, and updating its response step-by-step via feedback. The clear
objective of ‘Jaan Hai to Jahan hai’ and to ‘break the chain of spread’ before it reaches ‘community
transmission’ helped the government face the dilemma of ‘lives vs livelihood’, pace the sequence
of policy interventions and adapt its response as per the evolving situation. India was amongst the
first of the countries that imposed a national lockdown when there were only 500 confirmed cases.
The stringent lockdown in India from 25 March to 31 May was necessitated by the need to break
th
st
the chain of the spread of the pandemic. This was based on the humane principle that while GDP
growth will come back, human lives once lost cannot be brought back.

1.26 The 40-day lockdown period was used to scale up the necessary medical and para-medical
infrastructure for active surveillance, expanded testing, contact tracing, isolation and management
of cases, and educating citizens about social distancing and masks, etc. The lockdown provided
the necessary time to put in place the fundamentals of the '5 T' strategy - Test, Track, Trace,